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ABSTRACT
In this paper we analyzetaxation using the conjecturalvariations
model of oligopoly. We demonstratethe way in which the incidenceof a
tax depends upon the pattern offirm interaction. The resultsobtained
have important implications forthe controversy surrounding thequestion
of whether a tax oncorporate income can be over—shifted. We also
study
normative aspects of taxation. Thefocus here is on the errors thatcan
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1. Introduction
Taxation usually is studied inmodels that postulate aperfectly
competitive market structure.'
Analyses that deviate from this ruletend to
focus on the Opposite polar
case of monopoly. Given that the"in—between"
situation__o1igopoly__j of major importancein western industrialcountries,
it might appearsurprising that oligopoly hasreceived such scant attention.
Of course, at leastas far back as Musgrave
[1959], it has beenrecognized that
the impact of a taxmay depend upon market structure.There is no definitive
model of oligopo1isj
behavior, however, and differentstories can have quite
different implications for taxshifting. The tendency hasbeen to
ignore oligopoly on the groundsthat "anything can happen."
Several models of oligopolistjc
behavior recently have received
considerable attention in the
industrial organization literature. In this
paper we analyze taxation within the
framework provided by one of thebest-known
of these, the conjecturalvariations model.2 Although thisapproach certainly
is not the unique solution
to "the" oligopoly problem, it issimple and
encompasses a wide range of models,
including monopolistic and competitive
behavior as special cases. Inthe framework of the conjectural
variations model,
are able tb demonstrate rigorously
how tax incidence dependsupon market
structure. The results obtained have
important implications for thecontroversy
surrounding the question of whether a taxon corporate income can be over—
shifted.
In Section 2, we review theessential aspects of the conjectural
variations model. Section 3 showshow an industry's output, priceand profits
are affected by the presence ofa factor or output tax. It is demonstrated2.
that,under quite reasonable conditions, the imposition of a tax can lead
to an increase in industry profits. The normative analysis of taxation
in a conjectural variations model is discussed in Section LI. Our focus
is on the errors that can arise in excess burden calculations when incorrect
assumptions on market structure are made. In Section 5, we summarize our
results and discuss some implications for future research.
2. A Conjectural Variations Model of Oligopoly
Consider an industry comprising n firms producing a homogeneous
product with a market inverse demand function PC']. Firm i produces x
units of output and incurs costs C[x.,t], where t is a tax parameter. The
firm's profits are
a.
(2.1)11 Cx.] =PCx+Ex.]x. —C[x.,t]
3. 1
Agiven firm's output decision will depend upon its expectations
concerning the response of its rivals to any change in the firm's level of
production. We assume that all firms have identical "conjectural variations"
equal to cS .Thatis, each firm believes that when it raises its output by
dx ,theother firms will raise their output by a total of tSdx1
E . con
(2.2)
where the superscript "con" denotes that it is the conjectured rather than
actual response.3.
Suppose that firm i's current level ofoutput is ?, andthe rest
of the industry producesZ x .Firmi's conjectured inverse demand
function,con[.] gives the price thatthe firm perceives will be associated
with each level of its output, conditionalon the current levels of its
output and the total output of the other firms:
con o o - o 0 P[x.; x., E xli =Fix.+Ex. +cS(x.-x.)J. 11.. .j 1 ..3 1 1
Eachfirm sets its level of output to maximizeits profits, taking con[.]
as the inverse demand function. In equilibrium,for each firm the conjectured
change in profits due to a change in itsoutput is equal to zero:
con
(2.3) 0 Fix. ÷ x.J ÷ (1+)P'[x. +x.Jx.-C[x.,t]. 1
Becauseall firms have identical cost functions, we will restrictour
attention to symmetric equilibria (i.e., thoseequilibria in whichx =x
for all firms).3 The equilibriumcondItion, eq. (2.3), may be written as
(2.L) P[nx] ÷ (l+S)P'[]x —C[x,t]0
The second order necessary condition fora firm's optimization problem is
2(l+cS)P'[nx] +(l+cS)2p"[nx]x-C[x,t]<0
The equilibrium level of output dependson the number of firms, the àonjectured
variation, and the level of taxes.This framework affords great flexibility in modelling firm behavior and
the degree of competition within the industry. If S —1, for example,,
each firm will perceive its demand curve to be flat. Eq. (2.'+) becomes
PCnx] -C[x,t]0
and each firm will behave competitively, setting its output at a level where
price is equal to marginal cost. At the other extreme, if ô =n-i,then
each firm has a conjectured inverse demand curve that is 1/n of the industry
curve. The equilibrium is characterized by
P[nx] +nxP'[nx]-C[x,t]
0
the monopoly condition that market marginal revenue equal marginal cost.
The firirwi1l behave like a monopolist or joint profit maximizingcartel.4
3. The Output and Profit Effects of Thx Changes
A shift in the tax parameter that affects marginal costs will in
general induce changes in the equilibrium levels of price, output, and profits.
In this section, we derive comparative statics results for these changes.
Consider an infinitesimal change in the tax parameter. Totally
differentiating the equilibrium condition, eq. (2.1-i), we obtain








Marginal costs are assumed to be a nondecreasing function of the
level of taxes; C >0.Theuniqueness of the equilibrium implies that5.
the denominator of eq. (3.1) is negative. Thus, is negative. An
increase in t leads to a fall inoutput and an increase in the market price.
The tax change will alter profits through two effects: (1) the
level of per-firm tax payments will change by and (2) the tax-induced
shifts in price and output will change before-tax profits by
dx.
(3.2) (P -C) +x.
Recalling that the equilibrium is symmetric, eq. (3.2) may be rewritten as
(3.3) {P -C+xnP'}
From the first order condition for profit maximization, eq. (2.L1.),
we see that the change in before-tax profits, eq. (3.3), is zero for
6 =n-iand positive for all6 <n-i.Intuitively, this result is clear.
When 6 =n-i,the oligopolists behave like a monopolist and x is set at
the joint profit maximizing level. Hence, the tax-induced change in output
has no first-order effect on profits. When6 <n-i,the firms' output
level is greater than the one at which joint profits are maximized. A tax
increase raisesmarginal costs and induces a reduction in the level of
output towards the joint profit maximizing level. The tax has the effect
of enforcing a collusive output restriction, and the tax increase leads to
higher before-tax profits.
The net effect of a tax change on profits is determined by comparing
the increase in before-tax profits with the increase in tax payments:
dTT' dx (3.4) z{p-C+xnP'} -
Ct6.
Depending on the patterns of taxes, tastes, and technology, a tax increase may
lead to either a fall or rise in after-tax profits. The net effect cannot
be known a priori.
To illustrate this point, consider Figure 1. Initially, the tax is set
at tand firm output is x .Thetax is raised to t .Asa result, the
0 0 1
marginal cost curve shifts upward, and the equilibrium level of output declines
by (x0-x1), the amount given by eq. (3.1). Area tuwy represents the decline
in profits due to the reduction of profitable sales, x(P_C). Area qrts
represents the increase in profits due to the higher price charged for the
units sold after the tax is imposed, x1P. Note that ceteris paribus,
area qrts increases with C .Byeq. (3.1), higher values of ext imply
greater output contractions and therefore greater values of
Area xyvz represents the loss in profits due to the increase in tax payments,
C, which is equal to x1 multiplied by the changein average tax per unit of output.
Given that area tuwy is positive, we see that > 0 only if the tax-induced
increase in price, LP ,isgreater than the increase in the average per-unit
tax, C./x1 (i.e., area qrts must be greater than area xyvz). Because qrts moves
with ext ,wecan conclude that the greater the extent to which ext exceeds
C/x1, the more likely is > 0
While it is possible that a tax increase will lead to an
increase in after-tax profits, a natural question is whether such an outcome is
plausible or is merely a theoretical curiosity. Economists often take
linear demand curvand quadratic cost functions as approximations of actual
demands and costs. When demands and costs have these forms, may be










x x 1 a8.
Suppose, for example, that the market inverse demand function is
P[nx]200 —8(nx),
and each firm has a cost function
C[x,t]w(l+t)x2
where w is an index of factor prices. Such a cost function arises when
the tax is levied proportionately on all factor prices and production is
homothetic and homogeneous of degree 1/2.6For the calculations, w was taken
to be equal to 1 and t equal to zero.
Using eqs. (2.L), (3.1), and (3.4),the tax-induced changes in per—
firm output and after-tax profits were calculated for a duopoly under
several different conjectural variations. The results are presented in
Figure 2. When 6 =-1,each firm sets its price equal to marginal cost;
output is pushed beyond the joint profit maximizing level. Here, the increase
in before-tax profits due to the output restriction dominates the increase
dfl1
in taxes; —--> 0 .Inthis example, when firms have Cournot conjectures (6 =0),
the direct effect of increased tax payments dominates; <0.At
6 =1,the duopollsts act to maximize joint profits, and the oniy effect of
a tax rise on profits is the decrease due to the increase in tax payments.
Recently, several authors have analyzed the notion of "consistenttt
or "rational" conjectures. Firms are said to have consistent conjectures
when, in equilibrium, the conjectured local responses are equal to the
true responses. For the case of duopolists with quadratic costs and a linear
demand curve, Bresnahan [1981] has developed a closed-form expression for
the consistent value of 6 .Applyinghis formula to our example the
consistent conjecture is approximately —0.61. For this conjectureFIGURE 2
-1 -.61 0 1
X2x 22.2 18.9 14.4 11.8
P[2x] 22.2 48.5 76.9 105.9
C[x,t] 123.5 89.6 59.2 34.6
U' 123.5 369.7 532.6 588.2
2 —2.5 —1.8 —1.2 —0.7
19.7 14.3 9.5 5.5
123.5 89.6 59.2 34.6
d]11
96.0 19.7 —22.8 —34.6
9.10.
19.7 >0.Thus,the result that a tax increase can increase profits
does not rely on irrationality on the part of firms, at least in this narrowly
defined sense.
Our example illustratthe shortcomings of attempting to analyze
oligopoly by looking at the polar cases of monopoly and competition. As
noted above, for monopoly, before-tax profits are not increased by the tax—
induced reduction in output, and =
-Ct
<0. At the other pole, under
perfect competition free entry leads to =0.Insome oligopolistic
markets the change in profits due to a hange in taxes is positive and does
not fall between the values of for the cases of monopoly and perfect
competition. Thus, it may be misleading to analyze taxation in an oligopolistic
market by interpolating the results for the two polar cases.
This discussion of competition raises the question of entry in the
present model. In our analysis, we have taken the numberof firms to be
fixed exogenously. One may think of the model in two ways. First, it can
be viewed as a short run analysis of a market in which capital stocks are
fixed. Second, it can be viewed as a long run analysis of a market inwhich
existing firms can adjust the levels of all productive inputs but sufficiently
high barriers exist to preclude the entry of new firms. Krzyzaniak and
Musgrave [1963 ,p.2] suggested that a positive value of was
likely to be a short run phenomenon, in the sense that it depended onthe
inability of firms to adjust their capital stocks. Our analysisindicates
that "over-shifting" can occur in the long run as well.11.
4.Welfare Analysis
It is well-kno that thepresence of a pre-existing distortion
complicates the welfare analysis of a tax.Typically, monopoly is the
only distortion induced by market structure thatpublic finance economists
study.7 In this sectionwe discuss the errors that might be made inestimating
the excess burden of a tax if oneerroneously assumes that the firms behave
as a monopolist (rSn-i) when in fact the oligopolis-ts do notmaximize
joint profits (5 <n-i).
Consider an investigator who has thefollowing information about an
industry: it has constant marginal costs CM ,priceP0, and
market output .Theinvestigator notes that the industry is composed
of several large firms, so that thecompetitive assumption is untenable.Instead,
he assumes that the firmsbehave like a monopolist. Aunit tax of t is
imposed on the output of theindustry. What is the excess burdenof the tax?
There are a number of ways to proceed. Our
investigator might begin
by using a diagram like Figure 3. The market demand and
market marginal revenue
curves are denoted by P[X] and MR[X],respectively, where Xnx is industry output.
The curves are sketched so that themarginal revenue curve
intersects the marginal costcurve at and the associated price is
P0
Prior to imposition of thetax, there is a monopoly excess burdenof cbd
which is a consequence of the factthat price exceeds marginal cost.8After
the tax is imposed, price andoutput are and X ,respectively,and
the incremental excess burden isabde.
Algebraically, the area abde can beapproximated by












dX dP Computation of the differentials and--clearlyrequires some
knowledge of the demand curve's shape. A typicalapproach is to
take advantage of the identity that characterizesmonopoly equilibrjum
(L.2) P(l +I) = M
where P is price, M is marginalcost, and rjis the price elasticity of




Assuming that nislocally constant, eq. (4.2) implies that dP(l + dM.
However, when a unit tax is imposed, dM is justdt, so
=
(1
The only additional information requirednow is an estimate of
Given the assumption of a locally constantelasticity of demand, X =P,
and
=P
Substituting eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) along with values for
P and M0
into eq. (4.1) yields an estimate of theexcess burden of the tax.
The investigator's belief that theindustry behaves as a monopoly
when actually it is a conjectural variationsoligopoly leads to two errors:
(i) an "econometric" error which arisesby estimating Tifromeq. (4.2),
and (ii) a "behavioral" error which isa consequence of using eq. (4.3)
to estimate how the price will respond to the tax.Note that even iferror (1) were eliminated, problems would still arise due tothe use of
eq. ('4.3).
To illustrate these points, consider the following example: an
industry consists of four identical firms which have constant marginal costs
of $2. Each firm has a conjectural variation of 6 =2.The market demand
curve is X =P2.Using the first order condition, eq. (2.4), the
equilibrium price is $3.22, and each firm's output is 0.024, so that market
output is 0.096.
As before, the problem is to estimate the excess burden of a "small"
per unit tax on industry output. The only data available to the investigator
are price, market output, and marginal costs. On the assumption that the
four firms can be modelled as a monopoly, our investigator computes the price
elasticity of demand by substituting P =$3.22and N$2.00 into eq. (4.2),
and findsrì =-2.639.Assuming an isoelastic demand curve, at least
locally, this value of ncanbe substituted into eq. ('4.3) to find
=1.610.Similarly, by substituting into eq. (4.4), is —0.0374.
There is now enough information to evaluate the excess burden formula,
eq. ('4.1). Specifically, the welfare loss generated bythe tax is $0.12l9
=(3.22-2)(.0374)(l.6lO)+ 4 (.0374)(l.6l0)2
Contrast this with a calculation made on the basis of the true model.
Because the welfare loss depends upon areas under the market demand curve,
Figure 3still provides the appropriate framework. Using a value of
=-2.0in eq. (4.4) yields dXIdP =-0.0599. is found by the chain
dPdP dX dP . . dX dX
rule: —= . isthe reciprocal of ,or1/—.0599. is
found by first finding from eq. (3.1), and then multiplying by the number of
firms the market (four), giving =-0.196.Substituting these15.
values in the excess burden formula,
eq. (4.1), yields a value of $0.5598
=(3.22-2)(.196) +(.o599)(3.272)2.Thetrue value is about five times
the value estimated on the basis of theincorrect assumption of
monopolistic behavior ($O.1219).
It might be argued that the comparison isunfair because the
investigator who assumes monopoly should also beallowed to start with the
correct value of the price elasticity of demand.Assume, then, that the
investigator obtaiiis independently the true valueof Setting ri =—2.0
• • dP dX . ineq. (4.3) gives --= 2.0. foundby substituting into eq. (4.4), is
—0.0599.Substituting these values into eq. (4.1) yieldsan excess burden
of $o.2659 =(3.22—2)(.0599) (2.0) +.- (0.0599)22.Although larger than
the earlier calculation of $0.1219, it is stillless than half the true
value of 0.5598.
As we emphasized at the outset, thesecalculations are intended
merely to illustrate the formulas presented earlier in thissection, and
there is no reason to take the specificquantitative results seriously.
They do show, however, that making incorrectassumptions on market structure
potentially can lead tomalor errors in welfare cost estimates.
V. Conclusion
We have discussed some positive and normativeaspects of taxation
using a conjectural variations model of oligopoly. Theassumption that an
oligopolis-tic industry acts as if it is competitiveor monopo1is-tic can
produce misleading results. For example, it isquite possible that a tax
on a factor used by oligopolists will raise theireconomicprofits,although
this result never could arise in thepolar cases. More generally,. we have
shown that impacts of a taxupon an oligopolistic industry need not lie
between those of monopoly and competition.16.
In their famous econometric study published almostenty years ago,
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave [1963] asserted that there was a positive relationship
between the corporate income tax rate and corporate profits. The finding
was roundly attacked. While our concern here is not the merits oftheir
particular statistical procedure, other economists1 comments on the theoretical
plausibility of the result are of some interest. The critics
Cragg, Harberger and Mieszkowski [1967] observed:
Not only does this result run counter to most economists'
judgments of plausibility, it also opens questions concerning
the pricing behavior of corporations which have wide
ramifications beyond the specific issue of corporation tax
incidence. Indeed, it is certainly not far from the truth
to say that if we accept the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave results at
face value, we must also accept the task of rebuilding the
foundations of the theory of the behavior of the firm.
(pp. 811—812)
We have shown that far from being outside the pale of economic theory, the
Krzyzaniak—MurVe result can be rationalized using fairly conventional
neoclassical tools.
Since the time of the debate over the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave study,
virtually all the work on taxation has assumed perfect competition.Within
this framework, authors have studied the effects of alternative assumptions
concerning production technologies and demand structures. General equilibrium
responses have been carefully taken into account,as have been dynamic
considerations Our results suggest that there might be a high payoff to
analyzing models that are perhaps simpler along these dimensions, butinclude
a more realistic description of market behavior. For example,it could be
instructive to fit a basic conjectural variations model to industrydata.12
The estimated coefficients then could be used to conduct positive and17.
normative analyses of taxationalong the lines suggested here."Anything
can happen" is not an excuse for
ignoring the empirically importantcase
of oligopoly in the study oftax policy.18.
Footnotes
1See, for example, the discussion of tax theory in Tresch [1981].
2The conjectural variations model is discussed by Bresnahan [1981]
and Seade [1980].
3Asymmetxic equilibria may arise in cases where a firm's profit
function achieves its maximum at two distinct output levels. Hence,
under the conventional assumption that each firm's profit function is
strictly concave, only symmetric equilibria will exist.
1Assuming that costs are convex.
5Hereafter for the sake of clarity, we will suppress the arguments
of the inverse demand and cost functions where thereis no ambiguity.
6A similar cost function can arise when only a subset of factors
is taxed.
7See, e.g., Harberger [i97Z., pp. 160—162].
8 It is assumed throughout that the structure of demand is such that
consumer surplus measures provide good approximations towelfare changes.
9Even more sophisticated methods for estimating the elasticity of
the market demand curve can be expected to lead to incorrectestimates if
the underlying theoretical model is misspecified.
10ofcourse,this means that he must ignore the fact that eq. (4.2)
is no longer satisfied.Lg.
11Forsome examples of the former, seeFullerton, Shoven, and alley
[1978]. For the latter, see Feldstejn[1974].
12See, forexample, Gollop and Roberts [1979].20.
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